Showing posts with label polls. Show all posts
Showing posts with label polls. Show all posts

Monday, September 24, 2012

Hollande's (Dis)Approval Rating

A president should of course ignore his or her approval rating. The public is fickle, and short-term thinking is a sure recipe for failure. But France2 reported last night that Hollande's approval had fallen 11 points in the month of August, from 54% positive to 43%. His fall from his post-election high of 67% positive is the fastest on record. Sarkozy at this point in his presidency was still above 50, and he did not drop to 43 until after the "casse-toi pauvre con" incident, almost 9 months into his term (after which, to be sure, he never recovered).

Clearly, "normality" is not enough, and not being Sarkozy is not enough. There is a danger to winning an election because the electorate is disenchanted with the incumbent, as first Obama and now Hollande have discovered. There is an expectation of improvement that comes simply from the fact that the thorn has been removed. But when the thorn has caused an infection, positive action needs to be taken, and if it isn't, the hurt only grows worse, and is magnified by disappointment.

Friday, August 10, 2012

Hollande Approval Down to 46%

Governing in a time of crisis is not easy. After 100 days in office, a new poll has Hollande's approval down to 46% and reflects a general pessimism on the part of the public. Indeed, pessimism more than disapproval of Hollande seems to be the driving force here: the French by and large do not see a way out of the crisis and don't expect Hollande to invent one. Realism is the watchword, and realism is not necessarily a bad thing. I think one can also say that Hollande has worked to reduce expectations, since he knows that he is not really in command of what happens to the larger European economy.

Thursday, May 3, 2012

Report des voix

LH2:
François Hollande bénéficierait du report de 93 % des voix de Jean-Luc Mélenchon, de 39 % de celles de François Bayrou, et de 22 % de celles de Marine Le Pen. Pour sa part, Nicolas Sarkozy recueillerait 50 % des électeurs de Marine Le Pen, 31 % de ceux de François Bayrou et de 2 % de ceux de Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Quelque 30 % des électeurs de M. Bayrou, 28 % de ceux de Marine Le Pen, et 5 % de ceux de M. Mélenchon voteraient blanc ou nul, ou ne se prononcent pas.
Hollande is still favored 53-47. The debate didn't change many minds,apparently.

Monday, April 23, 2012

IFOP: Debates Don't Do It

IFOP says that debates have never changed the outcome, Sarkozy has fewer reserves than in 2007, and the MLP report des voix is 48/31/21:

Jérôme Fourquet : Actuellement, les reports que nous observons dans les intentions de vote pour le second tour indiquent que 48 % des électeurs de Marine Le Pen ont l'intention de voter pour Nicolas Sarkozy, 31 % François Hollande, et 21 % sont tentés par l'abstention au second tour.
Don't take this to the bank, however. They got round 1 wrong!

A Question about the Polls and the Vote

Several commenters have suggested that the discrepancy between the FN vote and the polls shows that people are still reluctant to own up to voting for the extreme right (a version of "the Bradley effect," as it were). But no one has explained why the polls overstated Mélenchon's vote. Were left-wing voters perhaps ashamed to say that they were voting for the bland Hollande rather than the fiery Mélenchon? Is it prerferable on the left to be thought a revolutionary rather than a pragmatist?

A different sort of explanation would look at the polls themselves. French pollsters rely on a method of quotas, which requires considerable understanding of the structure of the electorate before sampling begins. Since the parties in France are unstable, especially the minor parties, that knowledge, based on analysis of previous elections, may be incorrect, leading to biased sampling. I don't know enough about the methods used to say why there might have been systematic errors in favor of Mélenchon and against Le Pen. Perhaps the urban concentration of JLM voters as opposed to the periurban concentration of MLP voters has something to do with it, as demographic patterns have been shifting too. In any case, I am skeptical of the "Bradley effect" stories and would suggest that the flaws are in the polls instead. And this raises doubts about the round 2 polling. The polls were actually quite accurate for the top-tier candidates in round 1, but round 2 depends on getting the transfer of votes right, and the poor results for the second- and third-tier candidates indicates that the polls may not have a good handle on this. So I'm not ruling out a significant surprise on May 6.

Friday, April 20, 2012

Analysis of 2007 Polling

Here.

Possible Surprises?

Éric Dupin speculates.

Le vent en poupe?

The final IPSOS poll before the blackout shows Hollande opening up a substantial gap of 3.5 points over Sarkozy in the first round. In the close second-tier contest between Le Pen and Mélenchon, Le Pen is now placed ahead, 16 to 14. Are these shifts real? Who knows? Sunday will tell the tale, and I can stop this mindless horse race reporting, which somebody with a Ph. D. in mathematics ought to know could well be statistical noise. Still, it's only human to speculate, and in these final days of the campaign, perhaps the polls are picking up early signs of a bandwagon effect: Hollande looks like a winner, so some who were going to give their protest vote to Mélenchon may be choosing to go for the gold.

The Youth Vote, Redux

Young people 18-24 are not terribly excited about any of the candidates, according to the latest IFOP survey, and many are still undecided or will abstain. Of those who have made up their minds,
According to the IFOP study, Hollande is the presidential hopeful that young French voters would most likely vote for in the first round (30%, topping Sarkozy’s 28%). “There’s a real right-left split, because the right does well among graduates of the most selective business, management, and public policy schools. Sarkozy also does well among medical and engineering students,” Kraus assessed. “Hollande does better among technical students and those studying humanities.”
As for other candidates, the study found that far-left Mélenchon would get 15% of all student votes, whereas far-right National Front candidate Marine Le Pen would get 11%. A different poll, carried out by leading market research firm CSA for daily newspaper Le Monde, surprisingly had Le Pen leading the pack of candidates among young voters with 26% of the vote.
(h/t Greg Brown)

Friday, April 13, 2012

Polling History

Le Monde looks back at the polls 10 days before the election in 2007 and compares the figures with the actual first-round votes. The polls underestimated the actual totals for both Sarkozy and Royal, came in slightly low on Bayrou, and considerably overestimated the vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Thursday, April 12, 2012

Hollande Will Not Negotiate with Mélenchon

François Hollande says that he won't negotiate with Mélenchon between rounds 1 and 2 of the presidential elections. Well, of course not. He's getting all of Mélenchon's votes anyway, but he's been losing ground in the "report des voix" among Bayrou voter, now divided 36/33/31 among Hollande, Sarkozy, and abstention, compared with 44/32/24 2 weeks ago. Is this a sign that Sarkozy's rhetoric--"it's me or chaos," an echo of the 1981 rightist chant "it's Giscard or Russian tanks in the place de la Concorde"--is actually having an effect?

In any case, Hollande seems to be gaining in second-round support from Le Pen voters. A bit strange, given the tepid campaign that Hollande has run. I hesitate to make large generalizations on the basis of error-prone and perhaps inaccurate polling, but could it be that these shifts show that when push comes to shove, Bayrou's supporters have their hearts on the right, even if it means reverting to Sarkozy, while working-class voters who have been drawn to Le Pen still remain moored to the left when it comes to the ultimate choice?

Of course the real question--and what may be giving Bayrou voters pause--is the negotiations that will take place before and during the legislative elections, not between rounds of the presidential. Mélenchon's PCF backers will want some concrete gains in the way of legislative seats and the financial support that goes with them. So they'll be pushing for an accommodation, and Hollande will want as large a majority as he can muster, so he'll be inclined to seek their support wherever it can help.