The Front de Gauche and allied groups will demonstrate today against the austerity policy that the government of François Hollande has embraced. Their anger is comprehensible. Hollande artfully campaigned on the notion that there was an alternative to austerity. He promised to renegotiate the Merkozy agreement, now respectfully rebaptized the TSCG and erected as a sine qua non of sound government. The gauchistes are also perfectly correct in their analysis of the consequences of austerity: there will be plant closings, business failures, layoffs, and suffering. To all of this Hollande now argues--or, rather, implies--that There Is No Alternative. This is the famous Thatcherite justification for retrenchment. So the only question is whether Hollande's implicit analysis is correct.
So what is the alternative? If France were to try deficit spending, would investors park their money elsewhere and send French borrowing costs higher? This is not absolutely certain. Germany cannot absorb capital indefinitely, and interest rates are already negative. To the extent that investors wish to remain in the euro, France would still be attractive even if it were to diminish the budgetary shock. Hollande seems to be gambling on "shock therapy": if he concentrates all the pain--a shock to GDP of -3%--in his first year, then things will improve over the remainder of his quinquennat. This would be a better bet if Germany were stimulating its economy, but it isn't, nor is anyone else in Europe. Hence the risk is a mutually reinforcing contraction that will steepen the slide and leave everyone in a deeper hole.
Politically, Hollande seems to be tacitly assuming that he can brave the anger from his left, because the left of the Left has no place to go. The Right can cavil, but he is essentially continuing the economic policy of Sarkozy-Fillon and in fact pushing ahead where they were too timid to go. His cuts are deeper, his tax hikes are sharper than the Right dared while it was in power. This is a big bet for an essentially cautious politician like Hollande, and it's not clear where he retreats to if things go wrong. Nor does he have any carrots to offset the lash of his many sticks. The likely outcome is a sharp rise in anti-EU, anti-German, anticapitalist sentiment.
Showing posts with label presidency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label presidency. Show all posts
Sunday, September 30, 2012
Wednesday, September 26, 2012
Bill Clinton for President ... of France
He says he could (h/t Greg Brown):
Bill Clinton told Piers Morgan that he could be president again, just not in the United States.I haven't checked the Constitution of the Fifth Republic to see if this is true.
Said Clinton: "There are only two countries I'm eligible to run for the leadership position is if I move to Ireland and buy a house, I can -- I can run for president of Ireland, because of my Irish heritage."
"And because I was born in Arkansas, which is part of the Louisiana Purchase, any person anywhere in the world that was born in a place that ever was part of the French empire, if you move to -- if you live in France for six months and speak French, you can run for president."
"However, I once polled very well in a French presidential race. And I said, you know, this is great, but that's the best I'd ever do because once they heard my broken French with a Southern accent, I would drop into single digits within a week and I'd be toast."
UPDATE: Seems it ain't so.
Monday, September 24, 2012
Hollande's (Dis)Approval Rating
A president should of course ignore his or her approval rating. The public is fickle, and short-term thinking is a sure recipe for failure. But France2 reported last night that Hollande's approval had fallen 11 points in the month of August, from 54% positive to 43%. His fall from his post-election high of 67% positive is the fastest on record. Sarkozy at this point in his presidency was still above 50, and he did not drop to 43 until after the "casse-toi pauvre con" incident, almost 9 months into his term (after which, to be sure, he never recovered).
Clearly, "normality" is not enough, and not being Sarkozy is not enough. There is a danger to winning an election because the electorate is disenchanted with the incumbent, as first Obama and now Hollande have discovered. There is an expectation of improvement that comes simply from the fact that the thorn has been removed. But when the thorn has caused an infection, positive action needs to be taken, and if it isn't, the hurt only grows worse, and is magnified by disappointment.
Clearly, "normality" is not enough, and not being Sarkozy is not enough. There is a danger to winning an election because the electorate is disenchanted with the incumbent, as first Obama and now Hollande have discovered. There is an expectation of improvement that comes simply from the fact that the thorn has been removed. But when the thorn has caused an infection, positive action needs to be taken, and if it isn't, the hurt only grows worse, and is magnified by disappointment.
Sunday, September 23, 2012
Ayrault Defends the TSCG
Mediapart once again leaps to the head of the pack in French journalism. The online "paper" has published a long interview with Jean-Marc Ayrault, the first in-depth defense of the TSCG by the Socialist government, which is now pushing for ratification by the parliament of an agreement negotiated by Sarkozy, which Hollande had promised to "renegotiate" but which is being presented to Parliament word-for-word as it was drafted by Merkel and Sarkozy. Ayrault, who is not unafflicted with la langue de bois, argues essentially that this agreement is but a step toward needed changes in European institutions. He presents the recent initiatives of the ECB as an example of such a change:
Mediapart is correct to point out, in the very next question, that promises of future changes in European institutions are cheap talk of a kind that has long plagued European institution-building. If the process is to move forward democratically, the French government needs to lay some concrete proposals on the table and make room for public debate. Ayrault is essentially asking for a blank check: to reject the TSCG, he rightly says, would precipitate an immediate European crisis. True enough, but it's past the time when this sort of blackmail should be allowed to underwrite Socialist policy. What is needed is at least an outline of an institutional reform that makes sense in terms of allowing a unified currency zone to continue. Does Hollande have a plan? Are there discussions with the Germans? Have the Germans put forward a plan of their own? What are the ECB and IMF suggesting? Ayrault addresses none of these issues, but even this feeble effort is more than we have seen to date, and it does signal that the necessity of a reform process has been recognized at the highest level. How that process is managed will reveal a great deal about the Hollande administration. Decisions cannot be put off indefinitely, and the public deserves to hear about what is being considered in private.
L’Europe est un combat, mais les peuples ont le sentiment que ce combat leur échappe. Il est illisible, mené d’en haut, technique… Or l’espoir suscité par la campagne électorale était aussi celui d’une repolitisation de ce débat européen. C’est une habileté tactique d’avoir promis une renégociation, qui est devenue une réorientation, et un pacte de croissance en complément, qui reprend des projets déjà engagés, sans objectifs précis d’emplois et de croissance ? Pourquoi avoir cédé au bout d’un seul sommet ?Ne faites pas l’impasse sur l’évolution du rôle de la BCE. Jusqu’à l’élection de François Hollande, c’était un sujet tabou. Là, elle s’installe progressivement dans un rôle qu’on souhaitait lui voir jouer. Ensuite, je vous ai dit qu’il fallait aller plus loin et porter d’autres investissements…Now, this is more than a little disingenuous. It's true that the ECB's decision to support southern-tier sovereign debt is a positive step, which has averted imminent disaster. But it's also true that the conditionality of that support--contingent on austerity imposed on the recipient countries and enforced by threats of a cut-off of aid--sets an institutional precedent that social democrats may not wish to support. It's also true that the ECB's change of direction had little to do with Hollande's election and everything to do with the fact that the markets had lost confidence in the ability of the southern-tier countries to survive. Investors have now changed their views but only because the ECB is implicitly guaranteeing a floor price on the bonds they are acquiring.
Mediapart is correct to point out, in the very next question, that promises of future changes in European institutions are cheap talk of a kind that has long plagued European institution-building. If the process is to move forward democratically, the French government needs to lay some concrete proposals on the table and make room for public debate. Ayrault is essentially asking for a blank check: to reject the TSCG, he rightly says, would precipitate an immediate European crisis. True enough, but it's past the time when this sort of blackmail should be allowed to underwrite Socialist policy. What is needed is at least an outline of an institutional reform that makes sense in terms of allowing a unified currency zone to continue. Does Hollande have a plan? Are there discussions with the Germans? Have the Germans put forward a plan of their own? What are the ECB and IMF suggesting? Ayrault addresses none of these issues, but even this feeble effort is more than we have seen to date, and it does signal that the necessity of a reform process has been recognized at the highest level. How that process is managed will reveal a great deal about the Hollande administration. Decisions cannot be put off indefinitely, and the public deserves to hear about what is being considered in private.
Thursday, September 20, 2012
Sarkozy Is Learning English
Maybe the Republicans should replace Romney with Sarkozy. He's a much better politician.
But Sarko might not fit with Republican mores:
But Sarko might not fit with Republican mores:
Un mois plus tard, il est chez son ami Jean-Michel Goudard, à Mollégès dans le Luberon, dans la propriété que le publicitaire a rachetée à la veuve du PDG de M6 Jean Drucker. La maison a le confort des grands hôtels, la perfection esthétique des magazines de décoration et Nicolas Sarkozy s'est toujours amusé de ces mannequins à longues jambes et à conversation réduite dont s'entoure Goudard et qui paraissent posées autour de la piscine comme des objets de décoration.And Carla? Is her conversation with the former head of state also "réduite?"
Tuesday, September 18, 2012
Hollande Denounces Religious Fanaticism
François Hollande made a strong speech today condemning the fanaticism that claims the mantle of Islam.
«L'honneur des civilisations islamiques est d'être plus anciennes, plus vivantes et plus tolérantes que certains de ceux qui prétendent abusivement aujourd'hui parler en leur nom. Il est l'exact contraire de l'obscurantisme qui anéantit les principes et détruit les valeurs de l'Islam en portant la violence et la haine.»And he said this in the presence of wealthy Muslim donors.
Monday, September 10, 2012
Interesting Electoral Data from INSEE
INSEE has published data on participation in the 2012 presidential election. The young and the old were most likely not to vote, either because they were not registered (in the case of the young) or abstained (in the case of the old). Since older voters were expected to be a core group in Sarkozy's base, this high abstention rate is surely one factor in his defeat:
(h/t Laurent Bouvet)
Sunday, September 9, 2012
Hollande's TF1 Interview
Le Monde's summary can be read here. To my ears, this was not an interview likely to allay doubts about Hollande's method or halt the rapid fall in his approval rating. He stated his goals forthrightly enough: he wants to turn the economy around within two years, reduce unemployment, and simultaneously reduce the budget deficit. We have known that all along. But are these goals compatible? And what exactly does he intend to do?
Well, he says that by the end of the year, by hook or by crook, there will be labor-market reform. He hopes this will come about through negotiations between unions and employers and even referred to this as "an historic compromise," harking back to the era of Eurocommunism, which had its own version of the necessary compromise between labor and capital. If this doesn't happen, he says, the state will step in to ensure that it is easier for employers to lay off workers when the layoffs are "anticipated." How palatable workers will find this promise (or is it a threat?) remains to be seen.
The CSG will be established on a broader base, but this is not a new proposal.
He promised to find an additional 30 billion in revenue by demanding greater effort from those who "have enough." Apart from Bernard Arnault, those earning over 1 million a year (not including capital gains), and unnamed "firms," the sources of this new revenue were not specified. Meanwhile, he promised that those in the two lowest income brackets would receive tax reductions or rebates, which further clouds the revenue picture.
He indicated that a "normal" presidency could also be an "action" presidency and tried to embody this with a certain rhetorical resolution--so resolute, in fact, that he frequently stepped on Claire Chazal's questions or answered as if he had anticipated them.
I'm not sure what the point of this exercise was. To be sure, the president told us that he means business and will achieve both growth and deficit reduction within two years, but he gave into his habit of talking rather quickly and breathlessly, as if he needed to get back to work at once on the details, which were once again as elusive as they were throughout his campaign.
Saturday, September 8, 2012
How Is He Doing?
It's the Mayor Koch question that's on everyone's lips in France: "How am I doing?" Only it's put in the third person and addressed to François Hollande: "How is he doing?" Now Hollande himself has gotten into the game, and he shows that he's been paying attention to the fact that everyone else is asking the question. And there's nothing surprising about his answer: "he" is doing just fine, "he" is going about things at his own pace, "he" is redefining the presidency, a task thrust upon him by the failure of Sarkozy's redefinition, etc. In this interview, he shows himself to be perfectly lucid but perhaps a tad optimistic about what it will take to succeed.
By contrast, Marcel Gauchet, whose answers are equally predictable, is perhaps a tad pessimistic.
I think Gauchet skirts the real question, which is whether economic liberalization, which he seems to favor, is compatible with existing European institutions, about which he confesses an aporia:
Yes, but what? The problem, it seems to me, is that Hollande has been totally silent about what kind of Europe he would like to see emerge from the crisis. And this silence is enabled and abetted by the nombrilisme of the French press, which is obsessed with the "How is he doing?" question and uninterested in the "How is Europe doing?" question. Read the Italian or German press, for instance, and you'll find daily commentary on Draghi's latest moves, on the partition of sovereignty given the assertion of unusual central bank powers, on the conditionality of bond purchases in the secondary market, etc. To be sure, France is in an anomalous position: in the short run it has benefited from the discomfiture of the southern states. It can borrow short-term at negative interest rates. But in the long run its competitive position is deteriorating further, as Spanish and Italian unit labor costs decrease.
France needs a strategy for survival in this new environment, and such a strategy requires thinking beyond France's borders. Limited labor-market reforms (such as the intergenerational contracts) do not address the need for industrial restructuring implicit in the single market. The "right question," to put it in terms of the Gauchet interview, is not a Franco-French question but a European question. And that can't be answered by asking how "he" is doing. France has to begin asking how "we" are doing, where "we" means we French together with our European partners. Because the euro crisis is no longer just a currency crisis: it is a crisis of the European Union and can only be resolved in transnational, not national, terms.
By contrast, Marcel Gauchet, whose answers are equally predictable, is perhaps a tad pessimistic.
François Hollande, c'est le contraire. Il a une conscience très aiguë de la difficulté des situations, mais cette acuité intellectuelle, doublée du scepticisme fondamental qui en est le corollaire, le rend indéchiffrable. On ne sait pas où il va et cette absence de direction a une conséquence immédiate sur la crédibilité de sa méthode : la concertation apparaît comme une façon d'esquiver les choix plus que de les préparer. Au fond, son intelligence le dessert. Un esprit sommaire et fonceur serait plus compréhensible par l'opinion.This sounds almost like Sarko-nostalgia, and, indeed, Gauchet is fairly explicit that that is precisely what it is:
En caricaturant, je dirais que Nicolas Sarkozy avait la direction, mais pas la méthode, alors que François Hollande sait faire mais n'a pas de cap. Contrairement à ce qu'on a beaucoup dit, Nicolas Sarkozy avait une vraie ligne politique : la banalisation américano-libéralo-européenne pour liquider les particularités françaises dénoncées comme autant de handicaps. La crise l'a empêché de réaliser son projet, mais il en avait un.What is not quite clear from the interview is whether Gauchet believes that Sarkozy's "direction" was the right one or whether he believes that Hollande shares that analysis.
I think Gauchet skirts the real question, which is whether economic liberalization, which he seems to favor, is compatible with existing European institutions, about which he confesses an aporia:
Quelle est à vos yeux la "bonne question" ?C'est évidemment l'Europe, qui est notre incertitude majeure, y compris par le scepticisme profond qu'elle suscite aujourd'hui. La difficulté pour Hollande et les socialistes est de sortir de l'épure mitterrandienne. Mitterrand a fait de l'Europe un grand dessein où s'inscrirait le destin français, mais il a fallu pour ce faire accepter d'en passer par une Europe libérale. Trente ans après, il se révèle que cette union par la libéralisation des marchés a entraîné l'Europe dans une impasse. Il est urgent de proposer autre chose. Mais quoi ?
Yes, but what? The problem, it seems to me, is that Hollande has been totally silent about what kind of Europe he would like to see emerge from the crisis. And this silence is enabled and abetted by the nombrilisme of the French press, which is obsessed with the "How is he doing?" question and uninterested in the "How is Europe doing?" question. Read the Italian or German press, for instance, and you'll find daily commentary on Draghi's latest moves, on the partition of sovereignty given the assertion of unusual central bank powers, on the conditionality of bond purchases in the secondary market, etc. To be sure, France is in an anomalous position: in the short run it has benefited from the discomfiture of the southern states. It can borrow short-term at negative interest rates. But in the long run its competitive position is deteriorating further, as Spanish and Italian unit labor costs decrease.
France needs a strategy for survival in this new environment, and such a strategy requires thinking beyond France's borders. Limited labor-market reforms (such as the intergenerational contracts) do not address the need for industrial restructuring implicit in the single market. The "right question," to put it in terms of the Gauchet interview, is not a Franco-French question but a European question. And that can't be answered by asking how "he" is doing. France has to begin asking how "we" are doing, where "we" means we French together with our European partners. Because the euro crisis is no longer just a currency crisis: it is a crisis of the European Union and can only be resolved in transnational, not national, terms.
Thursday, September 6, 2012
Hollande Bashing
Le Monde today features a piece on "Hollande bashing." Le dénigrement, the paper helpfully explains, for those who don't understand franglais. The article presents the phenomenon as a media fashion, and I suppose I'm guilty in my own small way of joining the bandwagon of bashers. I haven't exactly warmed to either Hollande's policies or his style of governance thus far. All the positive has been in the contrast with Sarkozy.
But I don't consider myself a Hollande basher. I think he faces a very difficult situation and is still feeling his way. I don't think he had a clear road map in mind when he was elected, and I believe that he's been relatively slow in trying to put one together since then, in part because the Socialists are rusty at government, having been out of power for so long. His team is inexperienced and ideologically heterogeneous (consider Montebourg and Moscovici). And no defining opportunity has presented itself.
On the other hand, Hollande deserves credit for remaining within himself, avoiding blunders, and mostly eschewing cheap effects. To be sure, he has kept campaign promises, some of them costly and of dubious merit, but the bashing would be worse if he hadn't. The chief concern is that opportunity is slipping away, but that is based on the notion that a presidency is defined by its first 100 days, which is sometimes true but not always, and can be overblown.
What Hollande needs, what Europe needs, is a galvanizing shock, an event that will create a moment to be seized. If that moment comes, and if Hollande can make the most of it, he will perhaps be able to dispel the morose climate and define himself. But not every president is fortunate enough to be presented with such a moment, and few are capable of taking advantage of it if it comes. Bill Clinton gave a brilliant speech last night at the Democratic Convention, but he was far from a brilliant president. Circumstances must conspire with the man to make a great president. So we should be patient with Hollande. His moment has not yet come--nor has it yet passed.
But I don't consider myself a Hollande basher. I think he faces a very difficult situation and is still feeling his way. I don't think he had a clear road map in mind when he was elected, and I believe that he's been relatively slow in trying to put one together since then, in part because the Socialists are rusty at government, having been out of power for so long. His team is inexperienced and ideologically heterogeneous (consider Montebourg and Moscovici). And no defining opportunity has presented itself.
On the other hand, Hollande deserves credit for remaining within himself, avoiding blunders, and mostly eschewing cheap effects. To be sure, he has kept campaign promises, some of them costly and of dubious merit, but the bashing would be worse if he hadn't. The chief concern is that opportunity is slipping away, but that is based on the notion that a presidency is defined by its first 100 days, which is sometimes true but not always, and can be overblown.
What Hollande needs, what Europe needs, is a galvanizing shock, an event that will create a moment to be seized. If that moment comes, and if Hollande can make the most of it, he will perhaps be able to dispel the morose climate and define himself. But not every president is fortunate enough to be presented with such a moment, and few are capable of taking advantage of it if it comes. Bill Clinton gave a brilliant speech last night at the Democratic Convention, but he was far from a brilliant president. Circumstances must conspire with the man to make a great president. So we should be patient with Hollande. His moment has not yet come--nor has it yet passed.
Friday, August 10, 2012
Hollande Approval Down to 46%
Governing in a time of crisis is not easy. After 100 days in office, a new poll has Hollande's approval down to 46% and reflects a general pessimism on the part of the public. Indeed, pessimism more than disapproval of Hollande seems to be the driving force here: the French by and large do not see a way out of the crisis and don't expect Hollande to invent one. Realism is the watchword, and realism is not necessarily a bad thing. I think one can also say that Hollande has worked to reduce expectations, since he knows that he is not really in command of what happens to the larger European economy.
Thursday, August 9, 2012
Comparing Presidencies at 100 Days
So, Hollande has passed his first hundred days. If any of you readers are obsessive enough to monitor my blogging output, you will probably find that the average number of posts per day has diminished since the election rather than increased. Indeed, my output is probably at a nadir in the five years that I have been keeping this blog.
It's interesting to compare the past three months with Sarkozy's first hundred days. To be sure, the blog was new back in August of 2007. Blogging fatigue had not yet set in, and I was still eager to build an audience, so much so that I recall blogging from hotel lobbies in Greece while on vacation, lest I miss a day's news and disappoint my then small but dedicated band of readers. But still, there was no shortage of news to fill my day's quota of posts. Sarkozy was a president who believed that in every presidency there is but a brief window of opportunity to lay down the broad outlines of policy change. He was determined to make his mark at the outset, and practically every day brought a new announcement. To be sure, governing by press release (le coup d'éclat permanent, as François Hollande quipped at the time) turned out to be not only the essence of the Sarkozy style but also the Achilles' heel. There was no follow-through.
Five years later, things could not be more different. The change is not solely due to blogging fatigue. And I think that Hollande's self-effacement is not just a matter of temperament; it's an entirely different philosophy of government. He seems to have rejected the whole "100-day shock therapy" approach. He thinks that the way to lasting change is to build consensus (in his own notoriously fractious camp, not across the board, which would be impossible), and this takes time. He knows that he can make headlines whenever he chooses--he did so during the campaign with his announcement of a 75% maximum marginal income tax rate, for example (see yesterday's post on the subject)--but he has also concluded that getting in people's faces this way gets their backs up too often and is ultimately unproductive. So he's moving slowly and cautiously and unobtrusively. And therefore, most days, there is precious little to blog about the chief executive, unless one wants to recount his trek across the beach, fully clothed, near the Fort de Bregançon.
The news, such as it is, is the inexorable news of economic austerity, currency crisis, and continental drift. A factory closing here, layoffs there, an ECB announcement one day, a "petite phrase" from Juncker the next (a Greek exit from the euro would be "manageable," the financial wizard tells us--yet another nail in Greece's coffin, even as Draghi hints that no one will leave the Eurozone on his watch), etc. etc. August is of course the cruelest month for newshounds, but this August seems particularly quiet, an ominous lull before what I expect will be a fall storm in Euroland.
The tale of two presidencies is thus inconclusive. We know that Sarkozy's shock therapy didn't work, but we don't yet know whether Hollande's "return to normalcy" will fare any better than Warren G. Harding's.
It's interesting to compare the past three months with Sarkozy's first hundred days. To be sure, the blog was new back in August of 2007. Blogging fatigue had not yet set in, and I was still eager to build an audience, so much so that I recall blogging from hotel lobbies in Greece while on vacation, lest I miss a day's news and disappoint my then small but dedicated band of readers. But still, there was no shortage of news to fill my day's quota of posts. Sarkozy was a president who believed that in every presidency there is but a brief window of opportunity to lay down the broad outlines of policy change. He was determined to make his mark at the outset, and practically every day brought a new announcement. To be sure, governing by press release (le coup d'éclat permanent, as François Hollande quipped at the time) turned out to be not only the essence of the Sarkozy style but also the Achilles' heel. There was no follow-through.
Five years later, things could not be more different. The change is not solely due to blogging fatigue. And I think that Hollande's self-effacement is not just a matter of temperament; it's an entirely different philosophy of government. He seems to have rejected the whole "100-day shock therapy" approach. He thinks that the way to lasting change is to build consensus (in his own notoriously fractious camp, not across the board, which would be impossible), and this takes time. He knows that he can make headlines whenever he chooses--he did so during the campaign with his announcement of a 75% maximum marginal income tax rate, for example (see yesterday's post on the subject)--but he has also concluded that getting in people's faces this way gets their backs up too often and is ultimately unproductive. So he's moving slowly and cautiously and unobtrusively. And therefore, most days, there is precious little to blog about the chief executive, unless one wants to recount his trek across the beach, fully clothed, near the Fort de Bregançon.
The news, such as it is, is the inexorable news of economic austerity, currency crisis, and continental drift. A factory closing here, layoffs there, an ECB announcement one day, a "petite phrase" from Juncker the next (a Greek exit from the euro would be "manageable," the financial wizard tells us--yet another nail in Greece's coffin, even as Draghi hints that no one will leave the Eurozone on his watch), etc. etc. August is of course the cruelest month for newshounds, but this August seems particularly quiet, an ominous lull before what I expect will be a fall storm in Euroland.
The tale of two presidencies is thus inconclusive. We know that Sarkozy's shock therapy didn't work, but we don't yet know whether Hollande's "return to normalcy" will fare any better than Warren G. Harding's.
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
Hollande in the Hamptons
It seems that François Hollande has inspired fear and loathing in the Hamptons. An article in New York Magazine quotes "billionaire Jeff Greene" (a name I'd never heard until a few moments ago):
“Right now, for some bizarre reason, a lot of these people are supporting Republicans who want to cut taxes on the wealthy,” he says. “At some point, if we keep doing this, their numbers are going to keep swelling, it won’t be an Obama or a Romney. It will be a Hollande. A Chávez.”
Monday, July 23, 2012
Hollande at the Vel' d'Hiv'
François Hollande gave a superb speech, one of his best, at the site of the Vel' d'Hiv', where Jews rounded up by the French police in 1942 were taken to await deportation. Giving full credit to Jacques Chirac, who was the first French president to acknowledge the responsibility of the French state--the French Republic--in this crime, he went even further than Chirac had.
Some people on the right are not happy, however. Henri Guaino is one of them. From Guaino we hear the familiar refrain that Vichy was not France, that the true France was in London with de Gaulle, etc. etc. One can understand the argument at a symbolic level, however feeble the actual adherence to the idea, let alone the reality, of resistance in 1942. What is not acceptable, however, is Guaino's further suggestion that Hollande's acceptance of responsibility in the name of France is motivated by an alleged affinity between Hollande and the collaborators of the 1940s:
Some people on the right are not happy, however. Henri Guaino is one of them. From Guaino we hear the familiar refrain that Vichy was not France, that the true France was in London with de Gaulle, etc. etc. One can understand the argument at a symbolic level, however feeble the actual adherence to the idea, let alone the reality, of resistance in 1942. What is not acceptable, however, is Guaino's further suggestion that Hollande's acceptance of responsibility in the name of France is motivated by an alleged affinity between Hollande and the collaborators of the 1940s:
Peut-être que M. Hollande se sent plus proche de la France des notables apeurés qui se sont précipités à Vichy après l'armistice? Ce n'est pas ma France.This is a slur on anyone whose reading of history is different from Guaino's. It is tantamount to an allegation that anyone who does not believe that l'Appel du 18 juin exonerates France--the state and the nation--of all responsibility for what happened during World War II is "objectively" a collaborationist. Such a charge is unworthy of M. Guaino, who is a student of history. He should know better, however commendable his commitment to the Man of June 18.
Tuesday, June 19, 2012
Le Style Hollandais
I like Hollande's understated style on the international scene. When David Cameron went out of his way to insult France by inviting tax scofflaws to flee to England, Hollande, rather than put up his fists and lead with his mouth, as Sarkozy would have done, simply said that he wouldn't be dragged into any exchange of low blows because he had too much noblesse d'âme. I'm sure Cameron felt the blow more than he would have felt a less subtle verbal blast.
Hollande's proposals on propping up Spanish banks also seem to have made some headway with Mrs. Merkel. I remain pessimistic, but perhaps le style hollandais will have what it takes to cut through the Gordian knot.
Hollande's proposals on propping up Spanish banks also seem to have made some headway with Mrs. Merkel. I remain pessimistic, but perhaps le style hollandais will have what it takes to cut through the Gordian knot.
Saturday, June 16, 2012
Musical Chairs in French TV News
Laurence Ferrari quit TF1. Rumor has it that Martin Bouygues wants to replace her with Laurent Delahousse, the France2 weekend anchor. Meanwhile, David Pujadas, the regular France2 anchor, has let it be known that he wouldn't necessarily refuse an offer from the commercial network if one were made. Who cares? you may well be asking yourself, and indeed the question of which pretty face reads the news isn't necessarily as important as the principals seem to think it is, especially in the era of the "normal presidency," which has the president traveling to the TV studio for an interview rather than summoning journalists to the Elysée for a carefully mise en scène representation of presidential power amid les fastes de la République.
Is it really "normality" that has guided Hollande's media decisions or rather a communications strategy as sophisticated as Sarkozy's but designed to take maximum advantage of the particular qualities of its "star," so different from Sarkozy's? And Sarkozy always seemed to be trying a bit too hard with his ever-shifting décor, carefully calculated camera angles, and studied displays of "attitude." As many commentators have remarked, that is why the now infamous Trierweiler tweet did so much damage. It undermined all of Hollande's effort to "dépipoliser" the presidency. Pour qui se prend-elle? was the reaction of many who had hitherto been pleased to find themselves with a president who didn't feel it necessary to use taxpayer money to erect a special mobile presidential shower stall in case the chief executive felt the need of une douche before a speech (as Sarkozy did).
Is it really "normality" that has guided Hollande's media decisions or rather a communications strategy as sophisticated as Sarkozy's but designed to take maximum advantage of the particular qualities of its "star," so different from Sarkozy's? And Sarkozy always seemed to be trying a bit too hard with his ever-shifting décor, carefully calculated camera angles, and studied displays of "attitude." As many commentators have remarked, that is why the now infamous Trierweiler tweet did so much damage. It undermined all of Hollande's effort to "dépipoliser" the presidency. Pour qui se prend-elle? was the reaction of many who had hitherto been pleased to find themselves with a president who didn't feel it necessary to use taxpayer money to erect a special mobile presidential shower stall in case the chief executive felt the need of une douche before a speech (as Sarkozy did).
Wednesday, May 30, 2012
EC Warns France
With Spain on the brink of banking collapse, the European Commission's warning to France will not get much attention. How many battalions has the EC anyway? Still, it would be wrong to dismiss the EC's concerns as merely another expression of "neoliberal" orthodoxy. French wages have been rising faster than productivity. French global market share has been falling. French industrial competitiveness has suffered. French social spending remains extremely high. And after five years of Sarkozy's "battle against all conservatisms," the French labor market remains much as it was under Chirac. With high and rising youth unemployment, one does indeed have to think twice about raising the minimum wage. With a budget deficit still too high, one does have to think twice about pushing the early retirement age back to 60 for hundreds of thousands of people.
Not that the Socialist government was unaware of these dilemmas before receiving the EC report. And not that being told to do these things by the largely discredited and disrespected EC is very useful in actually getting them done. But Hollande has been very reticent in explaining exactly where he would like the French economy to go. In his appearance last night on France2, he repeated the themes of his campaign but added no strategic direction. He was at pains to emphasize his "normality" by pointing out that he came to the studio rather than having the TV cameras come to the Elysée, but of course this was anything but "normal" for a president. What he really meant was that he intends to maintain his "simplicity," to govern as he led the party and ran for office, without giving himself airs. He is now president, however, even without the monarchical trappings. That makes him responsible. He may prefer to "lead from behind," but he still has to lead. As refreshing as the change of style is, he must take care, lest "simplicity" turn into emptiness.
Not that the Socialist government was unaware of these dilemmas before receiving the EC report. And not that being told to do these things by the largely discredited and disrespected EC is very useful in actually getting them done. But Hollande has been very reticent in explaining exactly where he would like the French economy to go. In his appearance last night on France2, he repeated the themes of his campaign but added no strategic direction. He was at pains to emphasize his "normality" by pointing out that he came to the studio rather than having the TV cameras come to the Elysée, but of course this was anything but "normal" for a president. What he really meant was that he intends to maintain his "simplicity," to govern as he led the party and ran for office, without giving himself airs. He is now president, however, even without the monarchical trappings. That makes him responsible. He may prefer to "lead from behind," but he still has to lead. As refreshing as the change of style is, he must take care, lest "simplicity" turn into emptiness.
Monday, May 28, 2012
Éric Dupin Contemplates Hollande's Victory--and His Predicament
Coralie Delaume reviews Éric Dupin's forthcoming book, based on extensive interviews with French voters during the campaign. Dupin paints a picture of a resigned electorate, rejecting Sarkozy but unenthusiastic about his replacement. He also portrays Hollande as a lucid candidate, well aware of the dangers of victory by default:
Mais on découvre au détour de l’ouvrage que François Hollande est parfaitement conscient de tout cela. La perspicacité du candidat, que l’on constate à l’occasiondu déjeuner qu’il partage avec Dupin, est frappante. Il sait notamment qu’au delà du simple fait de gagner, les conditions de l’exercice du pouvoir dépendront fortement de celles de la victoire. Hollande sait qu’une victoire dans un mouchoir de poche n’équivaut pas à une victoire franche et massive. Et qu’une élection par défaut n’offre pas les mêmes marges de manœuvre qu’une large adhésion. Le candidat affiche tout à la fois une détermination sans faille, et une prudence sagace : « à la différence de 1981, cette victoire est sans attente immense, c’est quand même un changement considérable » puis d’ajouter : « toute victoire a sa part de poison ».This suggests that Hollande will initially be even more cautious than his naturally prudent manner would suggest. But we shall see. Apparently, the eurobonds idea has begun to gain some traction, and Hollande's entourage has indicated a readiness to explore many variations on the theme. This is an encouraging sign.
Saturday, May 19, 2012
Article in TNR Online
I've got an article on Hollande on The New Republic Online. An error has crept into the second paragraph, which should of course state that Mitterrand was president "from 1981 until 1995 (he died in 1996)."
Friday, May 18, 2012
Hélas!
One doesn't have to like Alain Minc to appreciate his shrewd and deliciously tart aperçus:
Avez-vous approuvé la campagne orchestrée par Patrick Buisson ?
Quand, au mois de janvier, M. Sarkozy fait la campagne que j'aime - sur le rattrapage de l'Allemagne, la compétitivité, la TVA sociale -, il ne gagne pas 1 point. Quand il fait la campagne "buissonnière", il en gagne 5 à 6. Cela me désole, mais cela en dit long sur la France. Le diagnostic de M. Buisson n'est pas complètement faux. Le candidat PS a fait la même chose en se gauchisant au fur et à mesure : la taxation à 75 %, ce n'est pas le Hollande de la primaire PS.
Or:
Ce rôle de visiteur du soir ne témoigne-t-il pas d'un dysfonctionnement au cœur du pouvoir ?
C'est la contrepartie de la monarchie française. Dans un système démocratique vous n'avez pas besoin de visiteurs du soir, vous avez des pouvoirs, des contre-pouvoirs. Dans le système monarchique, le roi a besoin de liens hors de système. J'ai envoyé des gens chez M. Sarkozy qu'il n'aurait jamais vus autrement. L'Elysée c'est une toute petite PME, qui court à hue et à dia. Le tableau de commande n'est pas à l'Elysée, mais à Matignon, qui gère l'Etat.
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